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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Aaron Knutsen appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult. This reply brief is necessary to address a disputed factual point, 
explain that certain errors are ripe for review, and to address a recently published 
opinion involving the vulnerable adult statute. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Knutsen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. However, to the extent that the State has 
inferred that, at the time of the alleged incident, V.M. was already living a specialized 
care facility, that inference is not accurate. 
The State claims, "V.M. was living in an intensive Care Facility for the Mentally 
Retarded." (Appellant's Brief, p.1.) However, a complete review of the record reveals 
that V.M. was living with her parents and brother at the time of the grand jury indictment 
which was approximately ten months after the alleged incident. (Grand Jury Tr., p.83, 
Ls.23-24; R., pp.12-14.) After V.M.'s release from Canyon View mental health facility, 
she moved to the Emerald House Assisted Living. (Tr., p.401, L.23-p.402, L.7.) The 
record does not indicate that V.M. was living at an intensive care facility prior to her 
admission to Canyon View. 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the court lack subject matter jurisdiction because the Grand Jury's term 
expired rendering the indictment issued void? 
2) Is Idaho's sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutional because it 
is overbroad? 
3) Does the application of Idaho's sexual contact with a vulnerable adult statute to 
private, consensual sexual relations between consenting adults violate 
Mr. Knutsen's right to due process of law and equal protection? 
4) Is Idaho's sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutionally void for 
vagueness in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
5) Did the district court err when it instructed the jury that V.M.'s consent to sexual 
contact was not a defense to the crime of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult? 
6) Should this Court vacate Mr. Knutsen's convictions for sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
convictions? 
7) Should this Cowi vacate three of the convictions of sexual abuse of a vulnerable 
adult because Mr. Knutsen's protection against double punishment under the 
double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions was 
violated, because he was charged and convicted of four counts of sexual abuse 
of a vulnerable adult where his actions amounted to one continuous act, without 
a break in the chain of events, such that he should only be punished for one 
offense? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because The Grand Jury's Term Expired 
Rendering The Indictment Issued Void 
Mr. Knutsen contends a valid Indictment was never entered against him, and 
therefore, the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over his case under 
Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. He asserts that the district court erred 
when it denied his motion to dismiss the invalid indictment. The State argued in its brief 
that Mr. Knutsen failed to challenge the district court's holding that it orally ordered the 
grand jury to meet on March 25, 2009. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) Additionally, the 
State argued that the grand jury did not convene until December 3, 2008, and because 
the grand jury indicted Mr. Knutsen within the six-month statutory period, the district 
court properly acquired jurisdiction. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) 
The State fails to understand Mr. Knutsen's argument Mr. Knutsen contends 
that the district court shortened the period of time that the chosen grand jury had 
jurisdiction to act. The order controls the period that the grand jury has authority to act. 
While it is true that, by statute, a grand jury may act for six months and the indictment 
was issued within the six months, the district court had shortened the grand jury's 
jurisdiction to four months. Therefore, unless there was a court order extending the 
grand jury's jurisdiction, it had no authority to act. 
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Ii. 
Idaho's Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Unconstitutional Because It Is 
Overbroad 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute is 
overbroad because it infringes on the constitutionally protected privacy and freedom of 
association rights of consenting adults to engage in sexual contact. Because the 
State's argument concerning the overbreadth argument is not remarkable, no further 
reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen simply refers the Court to pages 13-26 of 
his Appellant's Brief. 
111. 
The Application Of Idaho's Sexual Contact With A Vulnerable Adult Statute To Private, 
Consensual Sexual Relations Between Consenting Adults Violates Mr. Knutsen's Right 
To Due Process Of Law And Equal Protection 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that Idaho's sexual contact with a vulnerable adult statute 
(I.C. § 18-1505B) is unconstitutional for violating substantive due process and equal 
protection. The State recognizes that Mr. Knutsen did raise the issues before the 
district court; however, it contends that the district court failed to make an adverse ruling 
and Mr. Knutsen failed to further object to not having an adverse ruling on the matter. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.17.) As mentioned in Mr. Knutsen's opening brief, the State 
argued to the district court the statute's legitimate state interest and that the interest did 
not infringe on any protected interest of another or violate substantive due process. 
( See Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Moreover, the district court found the statute 
constitutional, and therefore, Mr. Knutsen asserts there is an adverse ruling. 
(R., pp.183-199.) 
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Even if the State was correct, that Mr. Knutsen failed to object to the scope of the 
district court's ruling on his motion or request clarification or reconsideration 
(Respondent's Brief, p.17), this Court should still review the issue because he did object 
to the error, this Court's review is de novo, and the error is reviewable under the 
fundamental error test announced by this court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
Alternatively, Mr. Knutsen would not object to a remand for the court's determination of 
whether the statute violates Mr. Knutsen's due process and equal protection rights. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified fundamental error and stated that to 
obtain relief on appeal for fundamental error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rigr1ts were violated; (2) the error must 
be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the 
failure to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must 
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, 
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the 
trial proceedings. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a 
defendant must first show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists," in that the error was 
plain, clear, or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of 
the Perry test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the 
defendant must further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless, 
i.e., that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. 
Id. at 226-228. Mr. Knutsen's claim is that the statute violates his constitutional rights to 
due process of law and equal protection, the error plainly exists, and if the statute is 
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deemed unconstitutional, Mr. Knutsen's conviction must be vacated. Therefore, under 
Perry, this Court should review the constitutionality of the statute. 
Recently the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the vulnerable adult statute 
may violate the Due Process Clause. State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, P.3d 
1 , 1014 (2014). In Hamlin, the defendant did not receive relief from the potentially 
unconstitutional statute because he did not take his case to trial and was unable to 
demonstrate, through a pretrial motion to dismiss, that the statute violated due process 
as applied to him. Id. at __ , 324 P.3d at 1015. Here, the case did proceed to trial and 
the evidence revealed that V.M. verbally consented to sexual contact. 1 The also 
that the conduct here was not private. (Respondent's Brief, p.1 ) Assuming for 
of argument that the conduct was not private, but consensual, Mr. Knutsen would 
guilty of a different code section, such as Idaho Code § 18-4104 (a misdemeanor). 
Because the State's remaining arguments regarding due process and equal 
protection are not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen 
simply refers the Court to pages 27-30 of his Appellant's Brief. 
IV. 
Idaho's Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Unconstitutionally Void For 
Vagueness In Violation Of The Fourteenth Amendment Of The United States 
Constitution 
Mr. Knutsen contends that the statue under which he was prosecuted is 
unconstitutionally vague because it fails both to provide fair notice of the prohibited 
1 There is an error in the jury instructions through which this jury was prohibited from 
determining whether V.M. consented to sexual contact. The jury instruction issue is 
contained in Issue Vin the Appellant's Brief and in this Reply Brief. 
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conduct and fails to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The State simply 
quotes the language defining "vulnerable adult" and declares the language "broad" but 
not vague. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) Contrary to the State's assertion, 
Mr. Knutsen does contend that the language is vague. In an attempt to explain how it is 
vague, Mr. Knutsen utilizes the facts of this case and hypothetical scenarios. The State 
also argues that the statute is not vague as applied. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) In 
its argument, the State focuses on I.C. § 18-1505, the general section prohibiting sexual 
contact with vulnerable adults, not the problematic I.C. § 18-1505, the statute that 
defines who is vulnerable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16.) VVith that distinction, the 
State's response is not remarkable, and no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, 
Mr. Knutsen simply refers the Court to pages 30-43 of his Appellant's Brief. 
V. 
The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury That V.M.'s Consent To Sexual 
Contact Was Not A Defense To The Crime Of Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the district court should not have provided the consent 
defense instruction, or alternatively should have utilized the consent instruction 
applicable to rape involving a person of unsound mind. Because the jury was 
incorrectly instructed, the matter should be remanded for a new jury trial with proper 
instructions. 
Recently, in Hamlin, the Court of Appeals recognized part of the problem with the 
vulnerable adult statute. The Hamlin Court stated, "a person deemed to lack capacity in 
one area of functioning will not necessarily lack capacity in other areas. Thus, not all 
'vulnerable adults' or, as is relevant here, all mentally retarded adults, are incapable of 
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validly consenting to sexual behavior." Id. at _, 324 P.3d at 1014. Therefore, when 
the court instructed the jury that "it is not a defense to the crime of Sexual Abuse of a 
Vulnerable Adult that V.M. may have consented to the alleged conduct" it misstated the 
law because a vulnerable person may actually be able to consent to sexual intercourse. 
The Hamlin Court went on to find that when an "individual who is a 'vulnerable adult' for 
some purposes is nevertheless capable of consenting to sex and does consent to sex in 
a private place, that conduct is protected by the Due Process Clause and may not be 
criminalized." Id. Because the State's argument concerning the inappropriate 
instruction is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen 
simply refers the Court to pages 44-48 of his Appellant's Brief. 
VI. 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Knutsen's Convictions For Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable 
Adult As There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Convictions Because The 
State Failed To Prove That V.M. Was A Vulnerable Adult 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support the jury's guilty verdicts. Because the State's argument concerning the 
sufficiency of the evidence is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. 
Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen simply refers the Court to pages 49-52 of his Appellant's Brief. 
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VII. 
Mr. Knutsen's Protection Against Double Punishment Under The Double Jeopardy 
Clauses Of The United States And Idaho Constitutions Was Violated Because He Was 
Charged And Convicted Of Four Counts Of Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Where 
His Actions Amounted To One Continuous Act, Without A Break In The Chain Of 
Events, Such That He Should Only Be Punished For One Offense 
r. Knutsen was with, and convicted of, four counts of sexual of a 
vulnerable adult despite the fact that the conduct was one continuous act, without a 
break in the chain of events. Because I.C. § 18-15058 contemplates a continuing act, 
Mr. Knutsen's protection against double punishment under the double jeopardy clauses 
of the United States and Idaho Constitution were violated. Because the State's 
argument concerning double jeopardy is not remarkable, no further reply is 
Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen simply 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Knutsen respectfully requests that this Court grant him relief consistent with the 
claims of error he has asserted in this appeal. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2014. 
/1 
I /?"' ~ ; I /J 1 /~ «flt / ~---01ANE M. WALKE _",,------~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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